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Of all the environmental crises threatening the long-run prospects for the human species,  





In 2000, a working group was initiated by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan with 
the objective of assessing the consequences of ecosystem change and to create the “scientific 
basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystems” 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [MA] 2005, p. 3). It was one of the main findings of the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that gains in human well-being never before had been 
achieved at such high cost in terms of degradation of ecosystems.  
Human well-being and ecosystem degradation are connected by the concept of ecosystem 
services, which are “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MA 2005, p. 40). These 
include provisioning services such as food, water, timber, fuel, fibre, and medicinal resources; 
regulating services, for instance, air and water purification, pollination, erosion prevention, 
and pest and disease control; cultural services that provide aesthetic, recreational, educational, 
and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and 
nutrient cycling (Engel et al. 2008, MA 2005). As the report points out, the supply and 
resilience of ecosystem services are severely affected by the on-going loss and degradation of 
biodiversity1 (MA 2005, p. 46). Few substitutes exist for biological species once they are 
extinct.  
From an economic point of view, biodiversity loss is the result of a dysfunctional market, 
which trades the environment as an asset although its price has been incompletely specified. 
In the absence of an appropriate valuation system (cf. Costanza 1997; Gowdy and McDaniel 
1995), the provision and use of ecosystem services is often subject to market failure because 
of imperfect property rights, the presence of external effects, uncertainty about future use or 
cost, and their public good nature (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009). However, whilst these 
characteristics have made conservation an area of government intervention and regulation in 
the past, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and institutional stakeholders (IUCN 2009, 
OECD 2010) have promoted “Payments for ecosystem services” as an additional and novel 
market-based instrument for securing conservation and sustainable use of ecosystem services.  
                                                 
1 As set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, “[b]iological diversity means 
the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between 






The voluntary, private provision of conservation activities is the core idea of the payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) approach. According to the theory of public goods, markets provide 
insufficient levels of environmental quality since its non-exclusiveness does not offer enough 
provision incentives for individuals (cf. Tietenberg and Lewis 2009, pp. 76). However, public 
goods can be provided on a private basis2, relying on a binding agreement and combined with 
a direct payment compensating opportunity cost (Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Gerowitt et al. 
2003). Accordingly, payments for ecosystem services can be broadly defined as a voluntary 
transaction where an ecosystem service or a specific land use to maintain that service is 
purchased by a service buyer from a service provider (Wunder 2005). In this way, PES 
address the price-setting problem by providing a “mechanism to translate external, non-
market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide such 
services” (Engel et al. 2008, p. 664). Incorporating a wide range of activities, such as land set-
aside, reforestation, clearance of invasive species, or adoption of agricultural practices that 
favour regionally endangered species, PES are increasingly used in developing and developed 
countries (See Wunder et al. [2008] for an overview.).  
Unlike other market-based instruments, such as tradable pollution or planning permits or 
taxes, all of which embrace a “Polluter pays approach”, conservation programmes based on 
payments for ecosystems services implement a “Beneficiary pays principle”. The rationale 
behind is the compensation of foregone profit due to voluntarily changed production methods 
or land management practices. Hence, PES are not substitutes but complement non-market-
based environmental instruments. They establish a level of environmental quality that exceeds 
the minimum secured by environmental legislation, introduce more flexibility and permit 
dynamic efficiency in the provision of environmental goods and services (Bizer 1997, pp. 52). 
In addition to inter-temporal efficiency considerations, payments for ecosystem services are 
also statically cost-effective if they are competitively allocated to those most capable of using 
them.   
Competitive tenders for allocating payments for ecosystem services have become increasingly 
popular in practice and have produced and inspired a rich scientific literature in different 
disciplines like ecology, environmental policy, agricultural economics, and economics. In an 
inverse (or reverse) auction-based PES scheme potential sellers of environmental goods 
compete for contracts with each other by submitting bids on their cost of providing the 
environmental good or service specified in the PES contract. The purchasing institution ranks 
bids according to an auction metric based on economic and ecological criteria and allocates 
contracts to the best-ranked bidders. If the financial budget is limited and the number of 
bidders sufficiently high, sellers are incentivised to bid close to their opportunity cost. 
Downward-bidding competition exploits heterogeneity in opportunity costs of potential 
providers, permitting a more cost-effective use of available conservation funds compared to 
                                                 
2 See Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) and Hirshleifer (1983) for earlier discussions and applied cases of the private 






fixed-rate payments (e.g. Cason and Gangadharan 2004; Ferraro 2008; Groth and Freese 
2006; Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 1997). 
Notwithstanding the advantages of PES, and auction-based programmes in particular, the 
effectiveness of a conservation scheme crucially hinges on the enforcement of the contract, 
and its efficiency depends on the reliability of the stated cost. Contractual relationships 
involving payments for ecosystem services are characterised by information asymmetries. 
Often, buyers of environmental services (governmental agencies, non-governmental 
organisations or private-sector actors) neither have sufficient knowledge about the “true cost” 
of programme participation, nor do they have the capacities to appropriately monitor progress 
and sanction non-compliance. 3 Moreover, the provision of an ecosystem service might not be 
directly observable or measurable in output units. The providing sellers (landholders) have 
better knowledge on their opportunity cost and can also flexibly adapt to changing 
environmental conditions. Sellers therefore have a strategic advantage and may use their 
private information to exploit information rents from the buyers (Ferraro 2008; Latacz-
Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 1998), with potentially adverse effects on programme 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
From a contract-theoretical perspective, the agreement between a seller and a buyer of an 
environmental good or ecosystem service constitutes a principal-agent relationship with one 
informed party (the seller/agent), whose information is relevant for the social welfare, and the 
uninformed party (the principal/buyer), proposing the contract (Salanié 2005). Since both 
parties have different objectives4, their constellation drives problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard that are particularly relevant in the context of competitive allocation procedures 
for PES contracts. If the buyer is imperfectly informed of the characteristics of the seller 
(hidden information), he might choose sellers who are providers at lowest cost but least 
effective in terms of conservation benefit (See Arnold et al. [2013] for a formal adverse 
selection model.). If the buyer is imperfectly informed of the actions of the seller (hidden 
action), the seller has an incentive to deviate to her individually rational level of compliance 
and the buyer cannot force the seller to implement the Pareto-optimal outcome (See Wu and 
Babcock [1996] for a formal moral hazard model.).  
Targeting adverse selection is complex as conservation schemes must be tailored in a way that 
makes it difficult for sellers to misrepresent their environmental characteristics. A menu of 
contracts from which sellers self-select an individually incentive-compatible contract would 
be a theory-driven solution but the practical implementation of a menu approach is 
challenging and involves high transaction costs (Ferraro 2008). Moral hazard can be 
addressed by making the seller’s payment contingent on contract compliance and results 
                                                 
3 According to Wunder et al. (2008, pp. 843) especially small-scale programmes do not dedicate enough funding 
to monitoring activities, and also large agri-environmental programmes implement annual site inspection rates of 
only five per cent. Moreover, sanctioning mechanisms are poorly developed. 
4 While a rational agent seeks to maximise the contract payment and minimise the cost of compliance, the 






instead of remunerating programme participation based on inputs. A results-oriented or 
outcome-based approach has the advantage of setting a direct incentive to provide the 
environmental good. However, a results-oriented payment shifts the risk of loss to the seller, 
making voluntary participation in the programmes unattractive. Another drawback of this 
remuneration method is the difficulty of finding appropriate indicators for measuring 
conservation outcomes (cf. Matzdorf et al. 2008), and taking into account the distorting 
influence of stochastic environmental parameters, such as changing weather conditions or 
market price fluctuations (Derissen and Quaas 2013; Zabel and Roe 2009).  
These concerns raise the more general question on whether contracts for the provision of 
environmental goods should be understood as complete, i.e. fully contingent on all possible 
states of nature, or whether the characteristics of this type of agreement fit better within the 
strand of incomplete contracts. A contractual agreement between a buyer and a seller is 
regarded as incomplete if some aspects of it are unobservable or unverifiable, unforeseen or 
indescribable in advance, or if writing them into a contract is too costly (Maskin 2002). 
Building on the foundations set by Ronald H. Coase (1960) and Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 
an incomplete contract approach recognises the bounded rationality of economic agents, the 
existence of transaction costs and the role of relation-specific investments in economic 
relationships. All these aspects are of practical relevance in environmental markets and more 
specifically in the contractual relations between buyers and sellers of environmental goods.  
Since the complete contract approach has been predominating in the scientific discourse to 
PES contracts, the range of solutions offered to moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
is driven by general or partial equilibrium theory. However, conservation neither takes place 
in a social vacuum nor does it involve completely rational decision-makers. On the contrary, 
conservation programmes create social externalities (cf. Greiner and Stanley 2013) and their 
effectiveness is strongly correlated to the individually shaped beliefs and preferences towards 
the environment (Jones 2010) and to the social capital inherent to a society (Pretty and Ward 
2001). Social capital as the “ability of people to work together for common purposes in 
groups or organizations“ (Fukuyama 1995, p.10) recognises relations of trust, common rules, 
norms and sanctions, and networks as important facilitators of coordinated action (Putnam 
1993, p. 167). Hence, perceiving a PES contract as an incomplete contract and acknowledging 
the relevance of social capital for conservation paves the way for a different economic 
approach to payments for ecosystem services that advocates the relevance of trust and 
reciprocity of trust for overcoming asymmetric information problems.  
In an incomplete contract, the interpersonal relations between the contracting parties and their 
social embeddedness need to compensate for the lack of formal institutions, e.g. insufficient 
third-party enforceability (Bohnet et al. 2001). For example, an investment specific to an 
economic relationship, i.e. with no or little value outside that relationship like in a PES 
contract, is risky and prone to opportunism by the other party (Williamson 1985). Taking such 
an investment requires trust – otherwise the relationship will suffer from socially inferior 






uncertainty and transaction cost (cf. Ostrom and Walker 2003). Trust in the seller by the 
buyer should be regarded as the first prerequisite to mutually beneficial cooperation in PES 
contracts and all other agreements involving natural resource management (Reeson et al. 
2008; Reeson 2011a). 
However, trust itself is a risky endeavour and does not pay off unless the trusted party 
reciprocates the trust, making the seller’s trustworthiness the second prerequisite for 
successful cooperation in PES contracts. Trustworthiness can be based on the social norm of 
reciprocity (Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007). Positive reciprocity, i.e. the act of returning a 
favour, is activated by a generous action, triggering what has been coined a “gift exchange” 
between principal and agent (Fehr et al. 1998; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Moreover, 
reciprocated trust creates a reputation of trustworthiness that can become a valuable asset and 
incentivise sellers to forego short-term rents for long-term cooperation (Ostrom and Walker 
2003).  
Acknowledging trust and reciprocity as prerequisites for cooperation provides a starting point 
for a different approach towards enhancing efficiency and effectiveness in conservation 
schemes. The activation of trust and reciprocity norms and the creation of incentives to build 
a reputation of trustworthiness are remedies to the exposed problems of asymmetric 
information that have yet to be addressed in the context of payments for ecosystem services. 
Against this background, it is the aim of this book to explore, analyse and provide empirical 
evidence on the role of trust and reciprocity as a means to overcoming asymmetric 
information in contracts for payments for ecosystem services.  
The leitmotiv of all three essays compiled in this thesis relates to the gains from cooperation 
that are achieved when individuals are able to develop and reciprocate trust. Particular 
emphasis is put on the interdependency of trust and reciprocity of trust with applied market 
principles such as competitive contract allocation and discriminatory pricing rules, as 
typically used in inverse auction-based PES schemes. In this context, the performance-
enhancing effect of trust and reciprocity of trust on contract-enforcement might be disturbed 
for three reasons:  
- Competitive bidding for contracts and payments triggers a “market instinct”5 in sellers 
and buyers of environmental goods that could become counterproductive to building 
and reciprocating trust, and prevents long-term cooperation.  
- A discriminatory pricing rule as common in auction-based programmes is blind in 
regard to the socio-ecological linkages that are deemed to be so important for 
establishing successful cooperation in the governance of the environment.  
                                                 
5 Reeson and Tisdell (2010) have coined this term for describing a reduced willingness to cooperate in a 






- Reputational incentives get lost if repeated bidding is subject to the same ranking 
criteria as in the very first contract period.  
A comprehensive analysis of these three hypotheses as well as empirical support is lacking 
but necessary in view of the increasing utilisation of competitive tenders to allocate payments 
for ecosystem services. This book aims at closing this gap and provides theoretical 
argumentation complemented by an empirical examination of the raised issues. The empirical 
parts are based on two laboratory experiments6 in which voluntary participants made 
decisions in a controlled environment. Experimental economics, i.e. laboratory and field 
experiments, has become a useful tool for testing hypotheses related to conservation 
instruments, and conservation tenders, in particular (See Schilizzi [2013] for a comprehensive 
review of laboratory experiments in this area.).  
Unlike field trials that test conservation instruments in their natural environment with real 
conservation activities (cf. Rolfe and Windle 2006), laboratory experiments create an artificial 
environment in which the variable of interest can be varied under ceteris paribus conditions. 
Experimental data may provide empirical support to hypotheses or disclose regularities, 
which are not well-explained by existing theories, and eventually enable refinement of the 
theoretical framework (Friedman and Sunder 1994). With regard to conservation instruments, 
experiments may also reveal innate characteristics in the population, such as the willingness 
to pay (or to accept as payment) for environmental goods, or act as a “test-bed” for new 
institutions or technical aspects before they are introduced in a field environment.  
Using laboratory experiments as a test-bed for the influence of trust and reciprocity of trust in 
conservation tenders, the essays in this book dedicated to experimental work embrace the 
principles of the so-called social engineering or design economics7 approach (cf. Santos 
2011). In order to be able to derive valid insights from experiments related to existing 
markets, the experimental design needs to reflect the market and its inherent incentive 
structure, as closely as possible, without neglecting the principles of induced value theory, 
namely, monotonicity, salience and dominance8 for validity of the collected data (Friedman 
and Sunder 1994, pp. 7). Hence, the experiments in this book have been tailored to fit the 
specific market characteristics of conservation tenders but have been reduced in their degree 
of reality if it was methodically necessary.  
                                                 
6 The experiments were mainly funded by the chair of Economic Policy and SME Research at the University of 
Göttingen, and to a smaller extent by a grant donated by the German Federal state of Lower Saxony. 
7 Design economics, as Ana Santos puts it, “is devoted to the (re)design of complex markets and other economic 
institutions to be implemented in context-specific environments, to which end the opportunistic behaviour of 
economic agents and their propensity to err must be taken into account. The ultimate goal is to conceive a 
structure of incentives such that individual actions can generate desirable social states” (2011, p. 719). 
8 The monotonicity condition requires that participants in experiments prefer more to less reward medium. 
Salience implies the relatedness between actions in the experiment and payments. The dominance criterion 






Unlike prior experimental work in this area, which kept the main focus on the bidding phase 
(e.g. Cason and Gangadharan 2004; Reeson et al. 2011b; Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann, 
2007), the test design developed for this book consists of an inverse auction and a contract 
stage, represented by an effort-level game9. The two-stage design permits an analysis of the 
interplay between behaviour in the competitive bidding phase and ex post contract 
enforcement, and is therefore well-suited to analyse information asymmetries in conservation 
tenders. With regard to monotonicity and dominance, a neutralisation of the subject-matter of 
the contract was necessary in order to level out environment-related characteristics and 
preferences of the participants. Therefore, the traded good has been neutrally framed as a 
public good, with non-exclusive and non-rival benefits for all market participants. Since most 
environmental goods share the characteristics of public goods, the collected experimental data 
on cooperation preferences as well as related analysis and interpretation has been discussed in 
regard to its relevance for conservation instruments.  
The thesis is organised in three chapters: The first chapter, by Nora Vogt, Andrew F. Reeson, 
and Kilian Bizer, addresses the potential conflict between competitive bidding and trust and 
reciprocity of trust in contracts for environmental goods, and shows how non-binding 
communication between sellers and buyers successfully eliminates information asymmetries 
in their contractual relationships. Building on the established literature on conservation 
tenders, the authors argue that contracts involving natural resource management are usually 
incomplete and that this makes trust a crucial determinant for the effectiveness of inverse 
auction-based conservation programmes. In order to prove this hypothesis, a two-stage 
experimental market design, a repeated inverse auction combined with an effort-level game to 
provide a public good, is developed, tested, and complemented by a bilateral chatting tool as a 
treatment variable. Since communication has been reported as one of the most powerful tools 
to solve social dilemmas, a text-based and non-binding communication channel between 
buyers and sellers was expected to enhance trust and trustworthiness, by opening a direct 
interface prior to the bidding phase. Organised as a within-subject experimental test design, 
participants interacted in both market environments with and without the chatting tool. The 
authors show that communication leads to Pareto-superior market results in the short and 
long-run without efficiency losses. Communication even continues to have an effect on 
cooperation behaviour after it has been switched off in the second phase of the experiment. 
They also provide empirical evidence for the parallel occurrence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in the experimental scenario without communication. Finally, the reported 
dominance of relational contracting and long-term contract relationships is another important 
                                                 
9 An effort-level game is an experimental test design developed for labour market experiments in which 
employers and workers conclude incomplete contracts (Camerer 2003, pp. 95). Participants acting as employers 
set a wage level and the contracted participant acting as worker individually decides on an effort level, i.e. 
degree of contract enforcement. Effort incurs convexly rising cost to the worker but generates linearly increasing 
payoff to the employer. Under the rationality assumption, self-interested workers will exert minimal effort and, 
therefore, profit-maximising employers pay minimal wages (cf. footnote # 4). Experimental applications (e.g. 
Fehr et al. 1998; Fehr and Gächter 2000) report systematic deviations from the non-cooperative game-theoretic 
equilibrium since workers reciprocate non-minimal wages with non-minimal efforts. The “gift exchange” is a 






finding of the survey, impressively demonstrating the role of trust-based relationships 
between the auctioneering institution and the sellers.  
The second chapter, by Nora Vogt, is concerned with the influence of discriminatory pricing 
on the performance of the market-based provision of environmental goods and its sensitivity 
to exogenous environmental influences. Supported by recent literature, it is argued that the 
effort of fulfilling a conservation contract is easily distorted by exogenous environmental 
influences, such as adverse climatic conditions, that are often unverifiable by the buyer but 
observable for the seller. These stochastic influences are beyond the seller’s control; however, 
the seller’s informational advantage gives rise to two possible response strategies: While an 
opportunistic seller exploits the additional information rents and undersells, a reciprocating 
seller interested in fulfilling the contract augments the bid to counterbalance potential 
distortions. The author argues that environmental risk is detrimental to the establishment of a 
reciprocal payment-effort relationship between sellers and buyers in the short-term and long-
term, and tests this hypothesis within the two-stage experimental design for the market-based 
provision of public goods. Environmental risk is modelled as a probabilistic upward or 
downward transformation of the performance level chosen by the seller and interacted as a 
treatment variable with fixed and random player identities. The resulting 2x2 between-subject 
test design permits a thorough empirical analysis of the impact of environmental risk on 
reciprocity norms in an anonymous trading environment, and with identification. The results 
demonstrate that environmental risk exacerbates the existing information asymmetries 
between sellers and buyers, negatively impacts the establishment of reciprocal payment-effort 
relationships, and reduces the efficiency and the effectiveness of the contract. Although some 
sellers maintain strong social preferences even in for them unprofitable situations, buyers do 
not put enough trust in the sellers and break up after negative shocks. Repeated interaction is 
found to mitigate the influence of environmental risk but the effect is less strong than in a 
comparative environment without risk. Finally, Logistic regression analysis reveals that the 
buyer’s acceptance behaviour is strongly determined by the ranking of bids, showing the 
potentially adverse effect of discriminatory bidding in heavily disturbed environments.  
The book concludes with the third chapter, by Nora Vogt and Kilian Bizer, which integrates 
the core aspects of the two experimental studies and questions the long-term performance of 
competitive tenders with multiple sign-up rounds. Based on a transaction cost economics 
approach, the authors argue that a repeated auction bears the risk of a “fundamental 
transformation“, i.e. asymmetry of bidding sellers and lock-in effects between specific sellers 
and the auctioneering institution, that weakens the intended bidding competition with 
uncertain consequences for cost-effectiveness. Based on a comprehensive literature review, 
the authors identify three sources of bidder asymmetry that are present in a repeated 
conservation auction. Learning, specific investments and the creation of social capital are 
hypothesised to bias the chances of winning a follow-up contract in favour of former auction 
winners, resulting in locked-in buyer-seller relationships. The authors compare selected data 
from the two laboratory experiments on conservation auctions and show under which 






relationships to be strongly bilateralised in the experimental auction scenario with social 
capital formation and learning effects, showing how communication with few bidders fosters 
asymmetry, whereas in the second scenario with limited feedback and learning effects due to 
a disturbed environment, they do not detect preferences of buyers for specific sellers. The 
authors show that long-term contract relationships are characterised by superior performance 
levels, suggesting that lock-in effects do not erode the effectiveness of an auction but that 
relationship-specific investments establish more favourable conditions for the provision of the 
public good, instead. Finally, in view of the mediocre performance of the market 
characterised by risk, they discuss institutional elements that would save reputational 
incentives in repeated auctions even under adverse environmental circumstances.  
Returning to the problem of asymmetric information in contracts for payments for ecosystem 
services posed at the beginning of this book, the lessons that can be drawn from this thesis are 
the following: Competitive bidding is a cost-effective allocation mechanism for payments for 
ecosystem services if the relationships between sellers and buyers of environmental goods are 
based on mutual trust and understanding, and if the provisioning environment is not overly 
distorted by external environmental influences. Otherwise, the competitive market structure 
inherent to auction-based programmes fuels opportunistic and selfish behaviour on both sides, 
with counterproductive effects for programme effectiveness and efficiency. Social capital has 
been approved as a very strong vehicle to increase efforts of contractors and to generate 
strong ties between them that contradict to some extent the initial idea of an auction on a level 
playing field. However, in view of the empirical evidence for a superior performance of long-
term contract relationships compared to low-cost short-term contracting, designers of future 
conservation programmes should provide sufficient opportunities to build trust and form 
networks (e.g. regular stakeholder meetings, transparent access to information), that are 
essential for securing the success of conservation programmes.  
Although this book provides important empirical evidence as to the relevance of trust and 
reciprocity of trust in conservation programmes, this work can only be considered a start, with 
limitations that suggest directions for further research. The line of argument relies to some 
extent on experimental evidence interpreted with econometric techniques, raising questions of 
internal as well as external validity. Therefore, a replication of the data and results reported in 
this book is desirable in order to validate and strengthen their argumentative power, and to 
explore hitherto neglected parameters, e.g. social identity. Moreover, criticism with regard to 
the real-world representativeness of results obtained in laboratory experiments is justified and 
can only be effectively rebutted by corresponding field studies. Therefore, field experiments 
or surveys collecting data on the short- and long-term impact of social capital in auction-
based conservation programmes are strongly encouraged and necessary for further research.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide and discuss field data, however, the different 
elements of the experimental market tested in this book relate to other strands of experimental 
research that are beyond an application to environmental markets. With regard to the gift 






relational contracts and long-term contract relationships, as relevant for every employment 
relationship. Moreover, the private provision of public goods and the dynamic interplay of 
competition and quality has immediate relevance not only in an environmental context but 
also with regard to the privatisation of educational and health services.  
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Reverse auctions are an established policy instrument for allocating conservation contracts. 
While the auction mechanism has been the subject of a number of studies, less attention has 
been paid to the post-bidding contract phase. As contracts involving natural resource 
management are usually incomplete, trust becomes crucial for the effectiveness of the 
programme. We test the effect of communication between auctioneer and bidders on bidding 
behaviour and contract fulfilment using experimental economics. We combine a repeated 
reverse auction with an effort-level game and use a bilateral chatting tool as treatment 
variable. Without communication, auctioneers tended to select the lowest-priced bidders, who 
invested substantially less than the socially optimal level of effort when fulfilling their 
contract to provide the public good. Relational contracting proved important, with effort 
levels and profits tending to be higher when auctioneers and bidders entered into consecutive 
contract relationships. In the communication treatment there was no evidence of price 
competition, as auctioneers were more likely to accept high-priced bids. However, an overall 
higher price level did not lead to efficiency losses, since contractors realised higher effort 
levels in return, establishing a ‘social gift exchange’. Our results demonstrate the importance 














 2    Environmental risk           negatively impacts trust and reciprocity in the market-based provision of environmental goods  


















Conservation contracts between a landholder and an agency are characterised by information 
asymmetries since monitoring is incomplete and the provided outcome is often not verifiable. 
Their contractual relationship is complicated by environmental risk, e.g. climatic conditions, 
that are often observable for the landholder, only. It was tested whether environmental risk is 
detrimental to the establishment of a reciprocal payment-effort relationship in an experimental 
auction-market for a public good, in an anonymous trading environment and with re-
identification of bidders. In this market, auction winning sellers either reinvest their contract 
payment in a public good or behave opportunistically and exploit information rents. The data 
show that environmental risk increases opportunistic behaviour of some sellers while others 
maintain strong social preferences even in for them unprofitable situations. Further, 
environmental risk is found to decrease contract efficiency and to disturb the formation of 
effective long-term contract relationships as buyers do not put enough trust in the sellers, pay 
minimal wages, and break up after negative shocks. Repeated interaction mitigates the 
influence of environmental risk by benefitting contract enforcement and increasing efficiency 
due to higher reinvestment shares of wages, although the effect is less strong than in a 
comparative environment without risk. These results suggest that in a variable environment 
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1. Introduction  
Market-based conservation instruments, such as “Payments for ecosystem services”, are 
increasingly used as an alternative to conventional command and control approaches. Within 
these instruments, landholders voluntarily agree to provide a conservation service that is 
‘bought’ by a regulating agency, at a specified price (Wunder 2005). Paying landholders for 
the provision of environmental goods and services establishes a principal-agent relationship 
between the regulating agency and the individual landholder. Their relationship is 
characterised by strategic and environmental risk and uncertainty, creating substantial 
informational advantages for the landholders. While strategic uncertainty refers to 
information asymmetries concerning the landholders’ actual activities, environmental risk and 
uncertainty (such as extreme weather conditions or changing commodity prices) imply 
external influences that are beyond the agent’s control but can substantially affect the proper 
fulfilment of a conservation contract (cf. Derissen and Quaas 2013; Zabel and Roe 2009; 
Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Messick et al. 1988).  
Environmental risk or uncertainty exacerbates informational asymmetries in principal-agent 
relationships, since the principal cannot differentiate between the agent’s compliance level 
and environmental influences affecting the output. While this increases the potential for 
opportunism on the part of the agent, in case of the principal trust comes at the expense of an 
increased risk of loss. As a consequence, these relationships often fail to be Pareto-optimal 
and are prone to moral hazard or adverse selection problems (cf. Arnold et al. 2013). Without 
environmental risk or uncertainty, informed agents can signal information, or reciprocate 
cooperative with non-selfish behaviour. If both parties have the option to respond reciprocally 
to the other party's actions, strategic uncertainty can be overcome and cooperation sustained 
as equilibrium (Fehr et al. 1997). Hence, repeated market interaction attenuates the risk of 
moral hazard since market participants can establish a reputation of reciprocating (Brown et 
al. 2004, 2012; Fehr et al. 2009).  
In a competitive market environment characterised by environmental risk it is questionable 
whether repeated interaction still leads to the formation of trust-based relationships, 
benefitting contract-enforcement. In combination with environmental risk, competition could 
become counterproductive to the maintenance of social preferences (cf. Reeson and Tisdell 
2010). This question is of particular relevance for the market-based provision of 
environmental goods, as long-term contractual obligations and stable relationships are 
preferable to short-term contracting. Environmental risk (and asymmetric information about 
its materialisation) might become an insurmountable obstacle to reputation-building and long-
term cooperation in environmental markets, thereby having a detrimental effect on the 
intended conservation measure and damaging cost-effectiveness.  
Previous experimental studies suggest that the presence of environmental risk and uncertainty 
impedes the establishment of reciprocity norms especially in one-shot or anonymous 






borrower relationship, environmental uncertainty from the lender’s point of view leads to a 
total break-down of credit granting if reputation-building and third-party contract enforcement 
are impossible (Fehr and Zehnder, in prep.). In the repeated game context with identifiable 
trading partners, there is experimental evidence for successful reputation building with stable 
and profitable contract relationships under environmental uncertainty (McAllister et al. 2011). 
The results of recent labour market experiments (Linardi and Camerer, in prep.; Gerhards and 
Heinz, in prep.) also indicate that environmental risk does not necessarily undermine 
reciprocal behaviour and cooperation. This paper questions if these findings for private 
returns also hold for the market-based provision of environmental goods, sharing 
characteristics of public goods.  
Experimental studies with voluntary contribution mechanisms to public goods point towards a 
reduced willingness to cooperate in view of environmental risk and uncertainty (Dickinson 
1998; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Keser and Montmarquette 2008; Messick et al. 1988). 
In view of a probabilistic and input-independent transformation of the return, participants tend 
to transfer their contributions to the private account that is unaffected by environmental risk 
or uncertainty (Gangadharan and Nemes 2009). Furthermore, contributions to the public good 
significantly decrease with increasing environmental risk of a probabilistic loss, with 
uncertainty about this risk, and also directly after a loss in the previous round (Keser and 
Montmarquette 2008). 
In the context of the provision of (public-good type) environmental goods in conservation 
schemes, landholders might be induced to decrease their efforts towards contract fulfilment 
over time if the result is uncertain and not directly observable for the regulating agency. This 
raises the question of the optimal payment design. Derissen and Quaas (2013) show 
analytically that in presence of both environmental and strategic uncertainty a combination of 
action- and performance-based payments is optimal, in which the action-based fraction 
increases with environmental uncertainty1. While this model is analytically straight-forward, 
it cannot address the question how the presence of environmental risk and uncertainty affects 
reciprocity norms and, hence, contract enforcement, in the one-shot case or with repeated 
contracting. 
Thus, it is the aim of this article to provide experimental evidence on how the (repeated) 
market-based provision of public goods is affected by the introduction of environmental risk 
on the buyer’s (representing the regulator) side. In this market, combining an inverse auction 
with an effort-level game, payoffs for sellers (representing the landholders) consist of a 
performance-independent wage and an action-based income component out of the public 
good. Sellers decide individually on the share of the wage they want to reinvest into the 
                                                            
1 While action-based (or input-based) payments apply to a pre-defined conservation measure, performance-based 
(or output-based) are contingent on the procurement of the environmental good. Pure performance-based 
payments are unfavourable with regard to environmental uncertainty, as the landholder bears the complete risk 
of loss. But pure action-based payments are not incentive-compatible in view of incomplete monitoring and 






public good. In a previous experimental study with a similar two-stage design (Vogt et al. 
2013), communication between sellers and buyers led to significantly higher wages, effort 
levels and more equitable profits for all market participants. Moreover, buyers tended to re-
conclude contracts with the same sellers, leading to highly efficient long-term relationships. 
The present experimental approach features an exogenous probabilistic effort transformation, 
only visible for the sellers, which substantially affects their individually rational performance 
level. Given the relevant empirical literature, it is questionable whether environmental risk 
increases self-regarding behaviour, or if sellers and buyers are more interested in establishing 
long-term cooperation and securing the provision of the public good for the entire market. In 
testing the market with a 2x2 experimental design (effort transformation x identification), it is 
investigated whether reciprocity norms can be established under environmental risk either in 
an anonymous trading environment, with identification and repeated interaction, or in none of 
the market scenarios.   
2. Methods 
2.1. Baseline scenario  
The experimental design permits the investigation of the behaviour of individuals under 
environmental risk and asymmetric information in a competitive market for the provision of a 
public good (cf. Vogt et al. 2013). Reflecting key-issues of inverse auction-based 
conservation programmes, the two-stage market is based on four main elements (Table 1). 
There are two types of players: a buyer (auctioneer) and three sellers (bidders) who interact 
over 20 periods.2  
Table 1: Design elements of the experimental scenario and corresponding stages in the market-
based conservation programme 
1. Inverse auction 
 
Selection of sellers based on 
downward bidding competition  
Landholders state their costs of programme 
participation, sealed bid discriminatory 
price rule (“pay-as-you-bid”) 
2. Incomplete contract 
 
Execution of the contract  
Individual choice of effort  
Provision of the ecological good or service 
Non-contractible quality of contract 
execution 
3. Public good  Shared contract dividend  
Non-exclusive benefit of the environmental 
good  
4. Repetition  Reputation building  Periodical re-enrolment 
At the beginning of every period, sellers submit wage offers between 100 and 250 
experimental dollars. The buyer then chooses and pays one seller out of a budget that is set to 
250 in every period. The contractual agreement between seller and buyer is incompletely 
specified (effort is non-contractible), which enables the contracting seller to freely choose a 
                                                            






quality of contract execution between 0 and 100. Effort incurs costs to the contracting seller; 
they rise according to a convex effort-cost function in the range from 50 to 200.3 Every 
contract generates a contract dividend that is split equally amongst all market participants; it 
rises linearly with the level of effort chosen by the respective seller.4 The shared contract 
dividend represents the non-exclusive benefits of the environmental good, generated by the 
seller’s effort. In every period, non-contracting bidders receive a share of the contract 
dividend and sellers also keep the remaining part of their wages. The buyer’s payoff per 
period consists of the share of the budget not spent for wages plus the contract dividend. In 
the basic scenario, the buyer and the non-contracting bidders are informed on the seller’s 
effort choice and their individual payoffs at the end of the period. 
Given this payoff structure, the individually rational strategy for sellers is to maximise their 
individual net gain from contracting. Figure 1a shows that the net gain function for sellers 
(linear contract dividend minus convex effort cost function) has an interior optimum (50) that 
is novel compared to the zero-effort Nash-optimum in other effort level games (e.g. Brown et 
al. 2004) but a better representation of the specificities of a socio-ecological dilemma (cf. 
Vogt et al. 2013, Cardenas 2011). Since this function is common knowledge in the game, 
rational auctioneers should not pay any wages exceeding the corresponding cost of effort 
(100).5  
Table 2: Combinations of strategies and impact on profits 








- , - + , -  
Non-opportunistic 
(high efforts) - , + + , +  
Note: Signs in the matrix denote combinations of strategies and relative impact on profits (seller, buyer), grey-shaded field 
represents social optimum. 
The social optimum, i.e. the maximum contract dividend and, hence, the highest provision 
level of the public good, is established only if the buyer pays wages higher than the Nash-
solution, and the seller reciprocates with higher efforts (cf. Table 2). As the seller has an 
incentive to deviate from the social optimum to the individually rational provision level, the 
buyer faces a trade-off between risky earnings out of the public good and secure income 
resulting from paying low wages. Hence, the buyer needs to trust the seller and accept a 
potentially efficiency-increasing wage.  
                                                            
3 Effort cost are calculated as follows c(e) =25 ∙ 4( . / ) ,  e is defined within the interval (0, 100). 
4 The individual share of the contract dividend    is calculated according to		 = 	 	(0.5 + /100)/ , where 
m is 0.5, 1.0 or 1.5 (p=0.33),   is a level parameter (set to 551), e is effort in the interval of (0, 100) and 	is the 
number of market participants (4).  






2.2. Probabilistic effort transformation  
As a source of environmental risk the public good can be subject to a probabilistic 
transformation, which is represented by the coefficient m in the contract dividend. The 
coefficient reflects environmental risk common in agricultural production and land 
management, such as extreme weather conditions. Information on the type of event taking 
place is asymmetrically distributed, as it is assumed that sellers have better information on the 
environmental conditions for their specific acreage than the buyers (cf. Cason and 
Gangadharan 2005; Derissen and Quaas 2013).  
A random generator determines m in every period. There are three types of events (m = {0.5, 
1.0, 1.5}) all of which are equally distributed with a probability of occurrence of 0.33 (E(m)	=	
1). The transformation increases (or decreases) the steepness of the contract dividend and 
implies a reduction (or augmentation) of effort cost for the seller. A positive shock (m = 1.5) 
improves the respective setting, increasing potential returns from the public good and moving 
the interior optimum from 50 to a higher effort level of 80 (cf. Figure 1b). A period with a 
negative shock (m = 0.5) represents worsened conditions for the provision of the public good, 
changing the interior optimum to a corner solution of 0 (cf. Figure 1c). Thus, a negative shock 
makes it entirely unprofitable for the seller to fulfil the contract. A neutral shock (m = 1.0) 
represents the default scenario without transformation, as used in the baseline (cf. Figure 1a). 
Independently from the type of event, the contract dividend is always maximised with an 
effort level of 100. 
Figure 1: Effort cost, contract dividend and net gain for contracting sellers under different scenarios  
 
Only the contracting seller ever knows the coefficient that will apply to the contract dividend 
in that period, and learns this prior to selecting an effort level6. This timing represents the 
seller’s information advantage to the buyer and the non-contracting bidders who all know the 
                                                            
6 The effort decision screen entailed a calculator with the corresponding effort cost, contract dividend and 






probability distribution but not the outcome. The buyer and remaining bidders learn the 
contract dividend and the total profit at the end of the period, but cannot distinguish with 
certainty whether their payoff was affected by a transformation or not.7  
2.3. Test design and experimental procedures 
A 2 x 2 between-subject factorial design is employed to analyse if reciprocity norms can be 
established under environmental risk in an anonymous or non-anonymous provision 
environment. Thus, identification and the probabilistic effort transformation are combined as 
treatment variables in two levels (Table 3).  
Table 3: Treatments used in the experiment 
2 x 2 Factorial design Random ID Fixed ID 
No effort transformation 
m set to 1.0 
BRID BFID 
Effort transformation 
m={0.5, 1.0, 1.5} p=0.33 
MRID MFID  
In the BRID baseline treatment, random re-matching of markets and random identification 
numbers (RID) in every period prevent reputation-building. MRID represents the anonymous 
market with environmental risk, including the effort transformation and random re-matching 
and IDs. In the MFID treatment, the probabilistic transformation of efforts is enabled and 
market participants are able to identify each other by fixed identification numbers (FID) and 
interact in the same constellation over 20 periods. BFID is the corresponding baseline market 
scenario without a probabilistic effort transformation8 but with fixed IDs, permitting repeated 
interaction. This design permits testing in three dimensions: (1) the overall effect of 
environmental risk on the market-based provision of a public good (RISK to BASE), (2) the 
effect of identification in a market with environmental risk (MFID to MRID), and (3) the 
impact of environmental risk on the formation and characteristics of contract relationships 
(MFID to BFID). A between-subject design is used in order to limit learning and other 
interaction effects, e.g. signalling strategies in RID treatments after playing with FID.  
Table 4: Session parameters 
  MRID BRID MFID BFID 
Sessions 3 3 4 4 
Markets 12 11 13 12 
Participants  48 44 52 48 
Periods 20 20 20 20 
 
                                                            
7  This excludes some cases in which other market participants could draw inferences from the announced 
contract dividend to the random event. Contract dividends < 69 indicated a downward transformation; contract 
dividends > 207 indicated an upward transformation.  
8 Instructions in BRID and BFID treatments did not include any information on a potential multiplier (cf. 






The experimental sessions were conducted at the Goettingen Laboratory of Behavioural 
Economics in Germany, from October 29 to December 14, 2012. Table 4 presents the session 
parameters. The computerised experiment was coded with z-tree software (Fischbacher 1999). 
Participants were students from different disciplines who signed up and were recruited via 
ORSEE (Greiner 2004). All students participated in one treatment only. Upon arrival each 
student drew a hidden subject number referring to a PC cabin. In the cabin they were each 
given the same instructions for all subjects except that it was written at the top “You are an 
auctioneer” or “You are a bidder”. After reading the instructions, control questions on the 
calculation of payoffs and other rules of the games tested the participants’ understanding of 
the experimental setting. During the experiment communication was prevented by physical 
separation. Participants in the experiment earned an average of 15.30 €.9 
3. Results 
3.1. Main treatment effects 
Figure 2 presents descriptive statistics of relevant market variables in all four treatment 
conditions MFID, MRID, BRID and BFID. The results are based on analyses of variances 
with two independent factor variables, producing the main treatment effects of environmental 
risk (BASE versus RISK) and fixed identities (RID versus FID) as well as their interaction 
effect. Moreover, non-parametric hypotheses tests are used for comparisons between single 
treatments.  
3.1.1. Offers (Figure 2a) 
An offer of at least 200 was necessary to realise the maximum level of the public good but the 
average offers in all treatments were below that threshold, even though offers in the RISK 
treatments were significantly elevated. Environmental risk induced sellers to make 
significantly higher offers regardless of whether they interacted in an anonymous or non-
anonymous market (F(1, 2819)=38.47, p<0.001). Furthermore, offers were higher if sellers 
and buyers stayed together in the same market (F(1, 2819)=6.15, p=0.013). Thus, sellers bid 
highest in the non-anonymous market with risk (MFID) whereas bidding competition was 
most intense in the anonymous market without risk (BRID).  
3.1.2. Wages (Figure 2b) 
Corresponding to the increased level of offers, buyers paid significantly higher wages if they 
faced environmental risk (F(1, 961)=17.71, p<0.001). Fixed IDs did not produce an equally 
strong main effect on wages (F(1, 961)=2.95, p=0.086). Although wages differed significantly 
between BRID and BFID (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=2.766, p=0.006), buyers facing 
environmental risk did not pay higher wages if they knew with whom they were repeatedly 
interacting. Interestingly, wages paid with fixed IDs were not statistically different between 
                                                            






BASE and RISK, indicating that risk did not overly distort wages in non-anonymous repeated 
markets. However, wages paid with random IDs differed significantly and reached the bottom 
line without risk (BRID) whereas the combination of risk and anonymity (MRID) led to the 
highest wage level across all treatments. Since the observed wage differential cannot result 
from reputation effects, the significant interaction effect (F(1, 961)=4.68, p=0.031) points 
towards substantial efficiency losses in anonymous risk markets.  
Figure 2: Influence of environmental risk on the six main market variables with fixed and random IDs 
reported as mean values with standard errors 
 
3.1.3. Efforts (Figure 2c) 
Environmental risk did not produce a clear main effect on efforts compared to the BASE 
treatments (F(1, 961)=1.35, p=0.245), suggesting that sellers did not behave more 
opportunistically with risk. However, sellers chose significantly higher efforts if they 
repeatedly played in the same market (F(1, 961)=41.09, p<0.001), regardless of whether their 






reputation seemed to have had a significant effect on sellers even in a heavily disturbed 
environment, as shown by the significant interaction between FID and RISK (F(1, 961)=5.98, 
p=0.015). But it was less effective as a contract-enforcing device compared to the scenario 
with complete ex post information for buyers (BFID). Although the effect of non-anonymous 
competition on contract execution is significantly larger in the base market10, the difference is 
still significant between the MFID and MRID market (Wilcoxon signed rank test: z=2.229, 
p=0.026). 
3.1.4. Profits (Figures 2d - f) 
With environmental risk, profits for contracting sellers but not for buyers were significantly 
elevated compared to the BASE scenarios. In RISK markets, contracting sellers’ profits were 
increased by 11 % (F(1, 961)=24.21, p<0.001). This difference can be explained with 
generally higher wages in markets with one-sided environmental risk and also reflects 
information rents realised by sellers who kept higher wage shares to themselves.11 Buyers’ 
mean profits remained unaffected by environmental risk but show a higher variance due to the 
different shocks. Fixed IDs significantly increased profits for buyers (F(1, 956)=6.74, 
p=0.010) but insignificantly for sellers, confirming less pro-social behaviour in random 
markets. Accordingly, contract dividends, i.e. the produced level of the public good including 
potential transformations, were significantly higher with fixed IDs (F(1, 961)=15.14, 
p<0.001). With environmental risk, contract dividends had a larger variance but were not 
significantly higher compared to the BASE markets.   
3.2. Responses of sellers to the three different environmental shocks  
In every round, only contracting sellers were informed on the environmental shock taking 
place. They could decide between optimising their effort choice corresponding to the shock or 
maximising the contract dividend despite the environmental condition. It was noticed earlier 
that the main effect of environmental risk on effort choices was insignificant across 
treatments (BASE versus RISK). Hence, despite the probabilistic shock, effort choices 
corresponded on average to those in the BASE markets. Nonetheless, seller behaviour was 
influenced by the random shocks as the distribution of efforts in RISK treatments is 
statistically different from sessions without (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test: exact p=0.039).  
As presented in Figure 3, sellers adjusted their effort choices with regard to the shock taking 
place. Corresponding to the shift of the individually rational solution (cf. Figure 1), effort 
levels in both markets were significantly lower in the negative shock (m=0.5) and higher if a 
positive shock (m=1.5) occurred. Compared to the distribution of efforts in the random 
market with environmental risk, efforts in the MFID treatment were higher in the neutral and 
                                                            
10 Wilcoxon signed rank tests are significant for the difference between BFID and MFID (z=2.368, p=0.018) and 
between BFID and BRID (z=6.792, p<0.001).  
11 While sellers in the MRID treatment reinvested on average only 75 % of their wages, sellers in the MFID 
treatment spent 83 % for the public good. By contrast, sellers in the base market with fixed identities kept only 
10 % of their wages to themselves. This share rises to 21 % in the random base market, confirming increased 






negative scenario. A nested random effects panel regression (Table 5) confirms these effects 
for both RISK markets, estimating a significant overall effect of fixed IDs of around 9 effort 
points.  
Figure 3: Distribution of effort choices in periods with negative, neutral and positive shocks, and 
corresponding BASE markets  
 
Note: Box-whisker plots with median, 25, and 75 percentile ranges and outliers, 
the vertical bars show minimum and maximum (excluding outliers). 
The size of the offer had a positive and highly significant influence on efforts, however very 
high offers did not necessarily translate to very high effort levels (partly due to the upper 
bound of the effort level) as shown by the significant negative effect of the squared offer 
variable. Moreover, a positive shock induced sellers to increase their efforts significantly by 
16 points in the random market and by 6 in the MFID treatment.12 The negative scenario 
made positive efforts unprofitable for the sellers and, indeed, sellers reacted with a significant 
effort reduction of around 16 effort points.  
                                                            
12 Coefficients presented must be interpreted with regard to the base category (neutral shock). In view of a 
neutral shock (m=1.0), RISK markets resembled BASE markets (cf. Figure 3), with efforts in the MFID 






Nevertheless, at the individual decision level 26 % of all sellers in the non-anonymous and 
13 % in the anonymous market aimed at the social optimum and realised effort levels beyond 
85 effort points in periods with negative shocks. By contrast, only 19 % of the sellers in the 
MFID and 30 % in the MRID treatment exploited their informational advantage and chose 
low effort levels (<15 effort points) if they knew it would be unprofitable. While this shows 
that a substantial share of sellers had non-opportunistic preferences for the provision of the 
public good, it also demonstrates the catalytic effect of fixed identities for non-selfish 
performances in risky environments. 









Fixed identity (MFID) 9.366** 
 (4.161) 
Negative shock -16.00*** 
 (3.639) 
Positive shock 16.34*** 
 (4.751) 
Negative shock x MFID -1.744 
 (6.416) 






Number of id 75 
Wald χ2(7)   187.75*** 
Note: Nested random effects panel regression with id-clustered, 
robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed id, negative and 
positive shock as well as their interactions are binary variables, 
base category is neutral shock MRID (m=1.0).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.3. Acceptance strategies of buyers  
In each round, buyers chose one offer out of three and paid the desired wage using their 
budget. Buyers and sellers knew that higher wages were necessary for socially superior 
contract performance. However, sellers competed for contracts and buyers had to decide 
between trusting and paying higher wages or distrusting and keeping more of their budgets to 
themselves. Environmental risk was not expected to affect decision strategies of buyers, since 






However, markets with one-sided environmental risk were characterised by significantly 
higher offers and higher wages. The causality of the observed effects is unclear, permitting 
two possible explanations. On the one hand, buyers could have preferred higher to lower 
offers in order to trigger reciprocal responses, thereby increasing offers over time. On the 
other hand, higher wages could result from the overall higher offer level. As the individual 
decision spaces of buyers were confined to the menu of offers in each round, a higher wage 
level would thus be a direct consequence of sellers making higher offers. In line with the 
rationale of an inverse auction, buyers would then randomly select the lowest-priced sellers 
and signalling strategies of sellers were ineffective.  
In order to address the causal relationship, a logistic regression (presented in Table 6) was 
carried out, measuring the treatment-specific odds ratios13 for sellers to be accepted as a 
contractor. To begin with the marginal effect of the continuous offer variable, the table shows 
that for all treatments the odds of acceptance slightly declined if sellers increased their offers 
by one unit. Although the size of the effect is small, it indicates a general preference for lower 
offers, independent from risk or identification of sellers. In case their offer was the lowest 
available in that period, the odds of being chosen by the buyer were significantly improved 
for sellers in all treatments. The strongest effect was measured for the base market with 
random IDs, for which the odds of being selected as a contractor were 5.6 times higher if a 
seller’s offer was the lowest available one, relative to non-minimal offers. The effect is 
smaller for MFID (3.6 times higher) and smallest for BFID and MRID (2.9). Hence, the 
relative ranking of offers was the most determining factor of the buyers’ decisions as buyers 
favoured the lowest available offer. Therefore, the increased wage level in markets with 
environmental risk was a direct result of increased offers by sellers.  
Under these circumstances it is questionable if fixed IDs and the probability to form a 
reputation really increased the chances of contract conclusion with environmental risk. And, 
indeed, while the chances of being re-selected as a contractor were significantly higher in the 
base market without risk, the effect of the lagged variable of acceptance is insignificant for 
MFID. Further controls reveal that contract-reacceptance in MFID rather depended on the 
shock in the previous period: If sellers contracted in periods with a negative shock, their odds 
of being re-chosen by the buyer in the next round were significantly reduced, compared to 
other shocks. As a result, buyer-seller relationships in MFID were also significantly shorter 
compared to the base market (Wilcoxon signed rank test on consecutive contract acceptance: 
z=3.720, p<0.001). Moreover, relationship length in BFID was positively correlated to effort 
(Spearman’s rho: ρ=0.1729, p=0.003) whereas there was no positive correlation under 
environmental risk (ρ= –0.0228, p=0.712). Hence, buyers contracted rather randomly based 
                                                            
13 The odds in favour of being accepted as a contractor are defined by the ratio of the probability of being 
accepted (p) to not being accepted (1–p). For example, in a market with three sellers (p=0.33), the odds for a 
seller to be chosen were 1 : 2. In a logit regression with standard output, the influence of an explanatory variable 
measured in odds is obtained by raising e to the power of the coefficient. Hence, a negative coefficient produces 
an odds ratio of a fraction smaller 1, a positive sign yields an odds ratio larger 1, and a coefficient of zero equals 






on the ranking of offers and failed to establish relationships as profitable as those in the BFID 
market. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of contract acceptance
VARIABLES Acceptance as 
contractor  
(Odds ratios) 
Offer       Base market random ID 0.996*** 
  (0.00150) 
 Base market fixed ID  0.996*** 
 (0.00147) 
 Market with environmental risk random ID 0.998 
 (0.00136) 
 Market with environmental risk fixed ID 0.998* 
  (0.00135) 
Lowest offer          BRID 5.603*** 
(1 if lowest available 
offer in the specific 
period; 0 otherwise) 
 (1.031) 
         BFID 2.938*** 
 (0.512) 
         MRID 2.901*** 
 (0.503) 
          MFID 3.367*** 
 (0.653) 
Accepted in the 
preceding round 




 MFID 1.401 
 (0.369) 
Negative shock (in 
preceding contract)  
MFID 0.341*** 
 (0.136) 




Constant  0.479*** 
  (0.119) 







Note: Logistic regression, standard errors in parentheses. Offer is a continuous 
variable interacted with binary variables controlling for each treatment; the other 
variables are factorial interactions of binary treatment variables. *** p<0.01, ** 








It was the aim of this article to address the question if the market-based provision of public 
goods is negatively affected by external environmental influences not observable for the 
buyer. Previous studies point towards an increased relevance of trust-based relationships in 
markets with asymmetric information (McAllister et al. 2011; Reeson et al. 2011; Vogt et al. 
2013) but also emphasise how environmental risk and uncertainty become obstacles to 
mutually beneficial cooperation (Fehr and Zehnder, in prep.; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009). 
This experiment was designed to examine the effect of one-sided environmental risk in a 
competitive market for a public good in a random market context and with repeated 
interaction with fixed IDs. The market-based provision of public goods relies on trust as a 
prerequisite for a socially optimal outcome but the fulfilment of the conservation contract is 
often not easily verifiable and might become affected by exogenous environmental influences. 
Thus, environmental risk could be detrimental to the establishment of a reciprocal wage-effort 
relation, and hence, leads to inefficient provision levels.  
The data analysis showed that environmental risk led to less efficient contracts, resulting from 
significantly elevated offers and wages but volatile effort levels, especially in the random ID 
markets. However, environmental risk increased opportunistic behaviour of some sellers 
while others maintained strong social preferences even in for them unprofitable situations. 
Repeated interaction with fixed IDs mitigated the influence of environmental risk by 
benefitting contract enforcement and increasing efficiency due to higher reinvestment shares 
of wages, although the effect was less strong than in a comparative environment without risk. 
Further, environmental risk was found to disturb the formation of effective long-term contract 
relationships as buyers did not put enough trust in the sellers and broke-up after negative 
shocks. Attempts by sellers to build a reputation were mostly ineffective since buyers showed 
distinctive preferences for the lowest-priced offers and followed rather random contracting 
strategies in the fixed ID scenario with environmental risk. As a consequence, contract 
relationships were less stable and also less profitable compared to the non-risk environment. 
In this experiment, the sellers’ contributions to the public good were positively correlated 
with the environmental risk multiplier, contrasting studies on public goods that reported 
significantly reduced provision levels in an uncertain environment (Dickinson 1998; 
Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Keser and Montmarquette 2008; Messick et al. 1988). 
Although the public good in this market was provided by only one seller, it generated a non-
exclusive payoff, creating a trade-off for the seller between the individual and social 
optimum, similar to the common public good dilemma. This trade-off was minimised in the 
positive shock scenario and sellers significantly increased their effort levels, benefitting from 
the favourable environment. In times of a negative shock, sellers significantly reduced their 
contributions to the public good although a substantial share of sellers realised effort levels to 
the benefit of the whole market. Repeated interaction doubled the ratio of sellers who chose 







Reputational incentives are very powerful in bilateral relationships characterised by 
asymmetric information (e.g. Fehr et al. 2009), but environmental risk combined with 
competition seems to undermine relationship-building. In this experiment, sellers chose 
significantly higher efforts if they were repeatedly interacting within the same market 
although they were not able to credibly build a reputation due to the changing environmental 
conditions. However, buyers did not respond with more trusting behaviour as shown by their 
lowest-bid acceptance strategy. Instead of observing a strong bilateralisation of buyer-seller 
relationships in repeated games (Brown et al. 2004, 2012; Vogt et al. 2013), buyers swapped 
sellers significantly more often if they were confronted with environmental risk. While 
shorter duration of employment relationships due to external shocks is supported by Linardi 
and Camerer (in prep.), it stands in contrast to the observed stable relationships in a non-
competitive, variable environment reported in McAllister et al. (2011), suggesting that the 
bidding competition induced buyers to terminate relationships earlier. Without knowing 
whether the observable contract outcome was subject to a transformation or not, buyers were 
less inclined to bear the risk of initiating a long-term reciprocal relationship and sooner tried 
alternative sellers. Moreover, the environmental shock made it more difficult and costly for 
sellers to maintain such relationships. 
The establishment of profitable long-term contract relationships mainly failed because buyers 
systematically favoured low offers to higher priced offers instead of a particular seller. 
Moreover, buyers tended to break up contracts after negative shocks. Overly selfish buyer 
behaviour in view of environmental risk contrasts with Gerhards and Heinz (in prep.) who 
report more cooperative behaviour by employers in experimental labour markets affected by 
probabilistic shocks. Environmental risk induced employers to pay higher wages to 
counterbalance potential productivity losses of workers. Against this background, it is 
interesting that sellers in this experiment also increased offers and pushed through higher 
wages in risk markets compared to the baseline scenarios. This finding could imply that in a 
risky environment higher wage premiums are needed to stimulate reciprocal behaviour, 
whereas in a setting with full information sellers are more concerned about their reputations 
and are motivated with less generous payments. In this way, these results could provide 
empirical support to Derissen and Quaas’s analytically driven argument to increase the action-
based share of payments under environmental risk (2013). 
5. Concluding remarks 
The results presented here suggest that environmental risk is an obstacle to establishing 
cooperation in the market-based provision of environmental goods. But it is surmountable 
given some sellers maintain non-opportunistic, social preferences even in adverse 
circumstances. Nevertheless, environmental risk leads to efficiency losses and disturbs the 
formation of effective long-term contract relationships as buyers do not put enough trust in 
the sellers. These insights are relevant in view of the increasing usage of market-based 






resources management, environmental risk and uncertainty will play an ever increasing role, 
and can substantially impact the socially desired effect of conservation measures. In 
addressing environmental risk in the principal-agent relationship between the regulating 
agency and the landholder, this study adds to our understanding on the functioning and 
performance of environmental markets especially in view of the challenges posed by climate 
change. The results suggest that reciprocity is of increased importance in a variable 
environment, potentially making competitive bidding a less suitable mechanism for allocating 
conservation funds in the future. 
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A1: Instructions for auctioneers and bidders for the RISK treatments (MRID, MFID) 
A2: Instructions for auctioneers and bidders for the BASE treatments (BRID, BFID) 
 
Note: The instructions were originally provided in German language and are reprinted in 
an English translation. Italics are used to distinguish those parts that were depending on 









following  instructions  carefully  as  they  include  all  relevant  information.  In  case  you  have  trouble 
understanding some parts of it, please indicate and your questions will be answered in your cabin.  
The experiment takes place in several rounds. In every round, you are asked to make decisions that 
you  need  to  enter  into  the  PC.  During  the  experiment  any  form  communication  is  not  allowed. 
Moreover,  you  are  only  allowed  to  use  the  PC  as  necessary  for  running  the  experiment. 















 In every round,  the effort chosen by  the bidder can be  transformed by a random mechanism, 
which may halve  the effort, keep  it constant or double  the contract dividend by half as much 
again. 
 The  contracting bidder  is  informed on  the event  taking place, before  choosing an effort. The 
other bidders and the auctioneer are only informed on the resulting contract dividend.  





















 [Fixed  Identity  Treatment  Condition:]  In  every  round,  the  same  bidders  play  with  the  same 
auctioneer. The auctioneer can clearly identify every bidder according to a number. 
 [Random Identity Treatment Condition:] The composition of group is shuffled in every round, and 


































 All  market  participants  (the  auctioneer  and  the  three  bidders)  receive  the  same  contract 
dividend. 






















 At  the end of one  round,  this  rounds  results  are  summarised  (total  revenue,  revenue of  this 
round, and components): 
 
Revenue as a contractor    =   Retained wage    +   Contract dividend 
 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































following  instructions  carefully  as  they  include  all  relevant  information.  In  case  you  have  trouble 
understanding some parts of it, please indicate and your questions will be answered in your cabin.  
The experiment takes place in several rounds. In every round, you are asked to make decisions that 
you  need  to  enter  into  the  PC.  During  the  experiment  any  form  communication  is  not  allowed. 
Moreover,  you  are  only  allowed  to  use  the  PC  as  necessary  for  running  the  experiment. 









































 [Fixed  Identity  Treatment  Condition:]  In  every  round,  the  same  bidders  play  with  the  same 
auctioneer. The auctioneer can clearly identify every bidder according to a number. 
 [Random Identity Treatment Condition:] The composition of group is shuffled in every round, and 













 The contract dividend rises  linearly with effort.  In other words,  the higher  the effort gets,  the 
higher rises the contract dividend. The maximum contract dividend is 100%. 
 The contract dividend is maximised with 100% effort.  
 All  market  participants  (the  auctioneer  and  the  three  bidders)  receive  the  same  contract 
dividend. 





























 At  the end of one  round,  this  round’s  results are  summarised  (total  revenue,  revenue of  this 
round, and components): 
 
Revenue as a contractor    =   Retained wage    +   Contract dividend 
 



















































































































































































































































































































































































Competitive bidding is considered to be a cost-effective allocation mechanism for payments 
for ecosystem services. We argue in this article that competition is not a necessary condition 
for sustaining cost-effectiveness in the long run. In a repeated conservation auction, learning, 
specific investments and the creation of social capital bias the chances of winning a follow-up 
contract in favour of former auction winners. Applying the concept of fundamental 
transformation (Williamson 1985), we argue that this asymmetry weakens competition and 
leads to lock-in effects between the auctioning agency and a stable pool of sellers with 
uncertain consequences for cost-effectiveness. We compare data from two laboratory 
experiments on auction-based conservation programmes and show under which conditions 
lock-in effects are likely to occur in a controlled environment. Our findings demonstrate lock-
in effects do not erode the effectiveness of an auction but change the rules of the game 
towards more favourable conditions for the provision of the targeted good or service. In view 
of the empirical evidence for a superior performance of long-term contract relationships 
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1. Introduction  
The creation of monetary incentives for the provision of environmental services and 
formation of competitive structures among the recipients of payments are drivers of cost-
effective conservation of biological diversity in developing and developed countries (Engel et 
al. 2008, IUCN 2009, OECD 2010). Following Wunder et al. (2005, p. 3), we define 
payments for ecosystem services as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-defined 
environmental service [..] or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being ‘bought’ by a 
(minimum one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and only if the 
service provider secures service provision (conditionality).” Since the financial resources 
dedicated to conservation issues are mostly limited, cost-effectiveness becomes a crucial 
criterion for buyers of environmental goods and services, e.g. environmental agencies.   
Cost-effectiveness implies that the available funds are allocated to the sellers who generate 
the highest conservation outcome per currency unit spent. Payment differentiation is one 
means of achieving cost-effectiveness as it takes into account that heterogeneous sellers can 
have different opportunity costs (Ferraro et al. 2008; Wunder et al. 2008). These costs can be 
revealed to the buyer with a sealed, competitive bidding mechanism, i.e. similar to a 
procurement auction. The economic rationale for the use of competitive bidding is that they 
create incentives for sellers to offer bids close to their true opportunity costs of programme 
participation. This enables buyers to select the cheapest sellers. Moreover, sellers face a trade-
off between a higher net-gain from a higher bid and decreased competitiveness (e.g. Latacz-
Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 1997, 2005). The present article discusses shortcomings of 
this logic and shows that, in the long run, competition is not a necessary condition for 
sustaining cost-effectiveness.  
Conservation auctions, i.e. payments for ecosystem services allocated on the basis of 
competitive bidding, are an established and well-researched policy instrument. They are being 
or were operated on a large-scale in the United States (USDA Conservation Reserve Program, 
running since 1985), Australia (e.g. BushTender, EcoTender and ALR – Auction for 
Landscape Recovery), and on smaller-scale projects around the globe (e.g. Challenge Funds 
in Scotland, Northeimer Modell in Germany, Southern Rivers Bush Incentives in New South 
Wales Australia). Moreover, the experience with auction-based conservation programmes is 
increasing in developing countries (e.g. Jindal et al. 2013). Some of these conservation 
auctions have been run over several contract periods, i.e. contracts were auctioned regularly 
amongst varying groups of sellers (for instance annually as in the USDA Conservation 
Reserve Program). From a conservation point of view, a long and stable contract relationship 
is preferential to the one-shot case (IUCN 2009). However, the economic consequences and 
inherent dynamics of repeated auctioning and contracting in long-term conservation 
programmes have not been sufficiently addressed.  
Field and experimental studies have focused on auction metrics (Reeson et al. 2011a; Rolfe et 





2004; Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007) and also highlighted their social dimension 
(Greiner and Stanley 2013; Jindal et al. 2013; Lockie 2013; Reeson et al. 2011b; Vogt et al. 
2013; Zammit 2013). A research focus on repeated bidding and contracting poses some 
challenges to the underlying theoretical framework because the one-shot auction format 
(mostly treated in the literature) converts to a repeated auction scenario, i.e. an indefinite 
sequence of separate auctions.1 Assuming rational behaviour and symmetry of bidders, game-
theoretic auction models (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 1997; Milgrom 2004) are 
suitable for one-shot auctions, but do not yield tractable results in a repeated auction context 
(Hailu and Schilizzi 2004; Reeson et al. 2012; Rolfe et al. 2009). Repeated interaction brings 
about learning effects, reputation effects and intertemporal competition concerns which can 
hardly be captured in an analytical model but require a more holistic approach. Therefore, we 
use transaction cost economics, complemented by the dimension of social capital, to offer a 
comprehensive explanatory approach to the effects of repeated auctioning of conservation 
contracts.  
Taking into account laboratory and field data, we identify learning effects, social capital and 
asset specificity as the three dimensions in which repeated conservations auctions differ from 
the one-shot case. We discuss how these aspects create asymmetry amongst successful and 
non-successful bidders over time. Applying the concept of the fundamental transformation 
(Williamson 1985), we argue that repeated conservation auctions bear the risk of reduced 
competition and lock-in effects between the auctioning agency and a stable pool of bidders. 
Finally, we compare data from two laboratory experiments on auction-based conservation 
programmes and show under which conditions lock-in effects are likely to occur in a 
controlled environment. In view of the empirical evidence for a superior performance of long-
term contract relationships compared to short-term contracting, we discuss directions for 
follow-up empirical work. 
2. Sources of bidder asymmetry in repeated auction-based 
conservation programmes 
Consider a simple, hypothetical government programme that targets the conservation of 
biological diversity on arable land by paying landholders for the provision of clearly defined 
conservation services for a limited time period. Due to budget constraints, there is an upper 
limit to the available number of contracts and the environmental agency must apply a 
selection mechanism that identifies some farmers as being preferential to others. Thus, the 
agency decides to differentiate payments by holding an inverse auction.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, there are two main stages of a conservation auction. The first 
stage is the inverse auction that serves to identify the optimal contractors according to a 
                                                            
1 This format needs to be distinguished from a sequential auction where bidders play several bidding rounds until 





ranking rule. Interested landholders are invited to submit their individual bid proposals, i.e. 
the amount necessary to cover their cost of programme participation. Then, the conservation 
agency selects the most cost-effective bids and enters into a contractual relationship with 
these sellers who are paid their bids (discriminatory auction format). Secondly, the ecological 
goods and services are provided by the contractors at the specified price in the contract stage. 
Complete monitoring is too costly to implement and it takes place with a small probability. 
Contract duration is fixed to a limited time period.  
Figure 1: Stages of an auction-based conservation programme  
 
Under these circumstances, only in the first auction round bidders are symmetric as to their 
chances of winning a contract (notwithstanding differences in their opportunity cost or 
ecological value). With the agency’s decision being based on only two selection criteria – an 
ecologic and an economic component –, bidders initially operate on parity since only cost-
benefit ratios count for programme participation (Groth 2010). Once all bids are ranked and 
contracts are made and executed for the first time, the auction logic will lead to two groups of 
landholders: those accepted to carry out the conservation service and those rejected. Given a 
stable pool of bidders both groups can compete again for contracts in the follow-up auction 
rounds.  
This raises two questions: Firstly, how will experienced and non-experienced bidders differ 
subsequently in their probability of winning a conservation contract? And secondly, which 
economic and ecological effects result from potential differences? We hypothesise that 
starting with round two of the auction bidders are increasingly asymmetric with regard to 
three aspects: 
- Learning: with regard to actual costs, foregone profit and bid caps, enabling price 
adjustments,  
- Social capital and reputation: reflecting the history of contracts, 
- Specific assets: programme-specific investments made in a previous round, not being 






2.1.  Learning 
Empirical results indicate that bidders learn from previous bidding rounds and that this has a 
significant impact on the bid proposals (Cason and Gangadharan 2004; Hailu and Schilizzi 
2004; Reeson et al. 2011a, 2012; Rolfe et al. 2009; Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007). 
Experience with the USDA Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) has shown that bidders 
quickly learn to adjust their bids. For the 1986 CRP sign-up rounds, Reichelderfer and 
Boggess (1988) reported that the distribution of bids decreased over the course of the sign-up 
period after decisions of the CRP authorities became publicly announced. Kirwan et al. 
(2005) found empirical evidence for increasing premiums (net-gains) of landholders who 
participated in CRP sign-ups between 1997 and 2003.  
The distribution of information between sellers and buyers in environmental markets plays a 
crucial role (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 2005). If not managed correctly, 
leakage of information on the average winning bids, the ranking criteria or the budget ceiling 
can incentivise strategic bidding in a repeated auction. As a consequence, the auction loses 
efficiency: If sellers inflate their bids (beyond their actual cost), less conservation can be 
financed per dollar. On the other hand if sellers underbid, the quality of the provided 
conservation service might suffer. These two sides are reflected in the experimental literature: 
While Cason and Gangadharan (2004), Hailu and Schilizzi (2004), Schilizzi and Latacz-
Lohmann (2007), and Reeson et al. (2011a) all supported the positive correlation between 
sharing and distributing of information and efficiency losses in a repeated auction, Reeson et 
al. (2012), Rolfe et al. (2009) and Vogt et al. (2013) reported that learning led to improved 
auction outcomes.  
The main reason for potential efficiency gains in repeated bidding rounds is the possibility for 
sellers to better understand and gain experience with the calculation of their opportunity costs. 
Depending on the conservation service aimed at in the programme, landholders may be more 
or less familiar with the required management activities and related cost. For instance, up to 
50% of all participants of the Southern Rivers Bush Incentives Programme (Australia) stated 
in follow up interviews that they had difficulties in calculating and estimating their cost. 
Overbidding can be reduced by multiple bidding rounds that enable sellers to learn the 
payments structure and to improve (reduce) their bids (Rolfe et al. 2009). But also inefficient 
underbidding can be reduced by the dissemination of information resulting from 
communication between auctioneer and each individual bidder (Vogt et al. 2013).  
Competitive advantages caused by information spill-over are in three ways different for the 
two groups of landholders (those rejected and those participating). Who benefits most 
depends on the flow of information inside and outside the auction. In very closed-off auction 
schemes, where the administrative agencies do not announce average winning bids or other 
criteria of the selection procedure ex-post, only the auction winners have information rents. 
This advantage vanishes with the amount of information publicly available (cf. Latacz-
Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 2005). However, auction winners have a second 





conservation service. This enables them to improve their skills and to mirror their bid 
calculation to their actual cost. Auction losers do not have the possibility to learn about their 
potential costs of contract execution. A third disadvantage for outsiders is the lacking 
possibility to build social capital with the agency and other participating landholders.   
2.2.  Trust, reputation and social capital 
Social capital is crucial for the successful management of natural resources and also a 
significant parameter for the effectiveness of market-based instruments (Jones 2010; Ostrom 
2003; Zammit 2013). As a multidimensional concept, social capital comprises social and 
institutional trust, norms of reciprocity, and embeddedness in groups, networks or institutions 
(Jones 2010; Pretty and Ward 2001). Social capital positively influences the willingness to 
engage for conservation activities, increases cooperation, and reduces uncertainty. More 
precisely, it addresses adverse selection and opportunism, which is of particular relevance in 
the context of an auction-based conservation programme.  
Although the definition of payment for ecosystem services (PES) requires the environmental 
service to be “well-defined”, in practice contracts on natural resources management are in 
many cases incomplete2, making trust between contractors a necessary component for 
cooperation. In conservation contracts, often neither the exact quantity nor quality of the 
targeted ecological good can be defined in specified terms. Moreover, conservation outcomes 
are difficult to measure and monitor, creating uncertainty and a potential for opportunistic 
behaviour. Consequently, for the agency high-priced bids are risky if they cannot rely on their 
contractors’ performance.3 This can easily lead to a “market for lemons” outcome with 
suboptimal conservation effort (Arnold et al. 2013; Vogt et al. 2013). Such an inferior auction 
result can be overcome if the agency puts enough trust in the participating landholders and if 
they reciprocate with non-opportunistic behaviour.  
Trust can be understood as an investment decision that leads to a positive return if the trustee 
reciprocates the trust placed on him (Ostrom and Walker 2003). Trust is reciprocated because 
of incentives or social norms (Hardin 2003). If the trustee’s preferences are encapsulated in 
the ones of the trustor, the trustee has an interest to reciprocate and continue the relationship. 
If not, the trustee may still feel morally obligated to honour the trust bestowed on him. 
Moreover, embeddedness in networks or groups can create social pressure for compliance 
(Jindal et al. 2013). In either way, reciprocity of trust increases connectedness between the 
stakeholders, self-enforces cooperation and leads to additional positive conservation outcomes 
(Pretty and Ward 2001; Zammit 2013).   
                                                            
2 A contract is considered incomplete if it is not as fully contingent on all states of the world as the contracting 
parties would like it to be (Maskin 2002). 
3 In this context, neo-classical theory predicts selfish behaviour due to the lack of credible commitments. 
However, a well-established branch of experimental literature provides empirical evidence on trust and 





Contrary to a one-shot auction where trust can be betrayed without future consequences, a 
repeated auction works in a different time frame, allowing sanctioning and reputation-
building. Auction winners can build a reputation of trustworthiness based on past activities, 
demonstrated motivation and capabilities, permitting credible expectations about their future 
behaviour. Hence, for the agency it pays off to re-conclude contracts with trustworthy bidders, 
who are intrinsically motivated, have a great sense of environmental responsibility or receive 
private benefits from the conservation service (Lockie 2013). However, the rationale of an 
auction still requires selecting the most competitive candidates, who might not be identical to 
those with the highest reputation. It is thus questionable whether a highly competitive 
selection mechanism jeopardises these benefits of social capital or if the existence of trust 
erodes the effectiveness of the auction.  
2.3.  Asset specificity  
Depending on the targeted conservation outcome, contract execution may require monetary or 
non-monetary investments during the contract period. These investments (or assets) constitute 
a third source of bidder asymmetry if they are specifically dedicated to the conservation 
programme. Asset specificity is a concept to describe the extent to which an investment is 
specialised to a particular contractual agreement. An asset is considered to be highly specific 
if changing from the originally intended usage to alternative applications leads to high losses 
in asset value.4   
In the context of agri-environmental programmes with uniform payments, asset specificity 
negatively influences contract adoption (Ducos and Dupraz 2007; Rørstad et al. 2007). Often 
required for more targeted policy measures, specific assets increase on-farm transaction costs 
(Rørstad et al. 2007). Since participation in a conservation programme is usually voluntary, 
high asset specificity bears the risk of low participation rates. However, a farmer’s 
willingness to participate in a programme associated with highly specific assets depends on 
the amount of (institutional) trust in the environmental agency or other administrative 
stakeholders (Ducos and Dupraz 2007).  
In contrast to a one-shot conservation scheme with uniform payments where specific assets 
reduce the gains from participation, repeated competitive bidding enables bidders to 
endogenise the cost of specific assets. This creates ex-post advantages for auction winners 
against losers if they compete for contracts in another auction round (Groth 2010). Since 
winners had already invested in specific assets and factored them into their bid calculation in 
the previous auction and contract period, ceteris paribus, their bids become more competitive 
against other bidders in the next round.  
                                                            






Williamson (1983) lists four dimension of asset specificity that can be adapted to 
conservation programmes. We add reputational aspects as a fifth dimension5: 
- Human asset specificity: Highly specialised skills that arise from learning, practical 
experience or professional training, 
- Physical asset specificity: Special machines or tools, which cannot be used for other 
purposes,  
- Dedicated assets: Discrete investments in generalised production capacity only made 
for the purposes of the transaction (e.g. specific changes in production methods),  
- Site specificity: the distinct value of land for conservation purposes, 
- Relational specificity6: The degree of successful interaction of contractors in the past, 
incorporating the reputation of trustworthiness. Relationship-specific assets are created 
through social interaction, and their degree of specificity is determined by the length 
and mutually assessed value of that interaction. 
2.3.1. Specific assets of sellers (landholders) 
Participation in a conservation auction requires a good understanding of the administrative 
procedure, and interested landholders might be unfamiliar with the payment mechanism (cf. 
Rolfe et al. 2009). Therefore, often preparatory meetings, mock-auctions or on-site 
assessments are held before the first auction takes place. For landholders these meetings cost 
time and effort and have only limited use in a non-auction related context. However, 
understanding the auction procedure is an initial investment in human capital and related 
transaction costs are no longer incurred in subsequent sign-up periods (cf. McCann et al. 
2005). Information meetings or on-site assessments actively support the formation of social 
capital. Landholders interested in a long-term contract relationship need to signal commitment 
to the agency and make relationship-specific investments. The more often buyers and sellers 
of conservation services interact, the more specific their relationship gets, providing 
opportunities to observe each other’s actions, motivation and capabilities.  
The level of physical asset specificity highly depends on the conservation measure and the 
local context (Mettepenningen et al. 2009). While the USDA CRP is based on land set-aside, 
some conservation programmes require the one-time purchase of specific equipment, for 
instance a mechanical weeder, or specific plants, e.g. for the re-vegetation of bush land as in 
the EcoTender (cf. Eigenraam et al. 2006). Besides potential physical investment, farmers 
need to dedicate assets in terms of changed production cycles or work assignment (e.g. 
                                                            
5 As Williamson points out (1985, p. 62), additional transaction-specific savings can form at the interface 
between transaction partners as regards economies through familiarity, institutional and personal trust. 
6 The terms “relationship-specific investments”, “relational assets”, “R-assets” or “relational capital” have been 
used interchangeably mainly in a management-related context, describing “the level [and value] of mutual trust, 
respect, and friendship that arises out of close interaction at the individual level between alliance partners” (cf. 





postponed mowing of grassland). Narrow conservation targets reduce options for establishing 
standardised routines; this implies increased asset specificity on the farm level (Rørstad et al. 
2007).  
In order to provide the targeted ecological good or service, landholders need to dedicate land. 
If it can be put under conservation measure depends on the requirements of the programme, 
e.g. the presence of certain species, or location in a catchment area. More targeted 
programmes require specific areas (Mettepenningen 2011). However, there are other 
dimensions how land can become specific to the conservation programme. Often, the 
conservation value of a site rises with the time being under protection (Kleijn et al. 2006), 
thus re-enrolment could be preferable to starting from scratch on another patch. Moreover, 
connectivity between sites increases the contribution of individual conservation actions 
(Reeson et al. 2011a).  
Whether specific patches of land generate competitive advantages within the auction largely 
depends on the auction metric and its capacity to differentiate between land types. Some 
conservation auctions rank bids on the basis of a multi-criteria index (e.g. the Environmental 
Benefit Index in the CRP or the Biodiversity Benefits Index used in the BushTender), others 
are based on site-assessments and individual management plans (e.g. Southern Rivers Bush 
Incentives Programme, New South Wales Australia) to find a better balance between 
ecological and economic ranking. 
2.3.2. Specific assets of the buyers (environmental agency) 
The agency in charge of executing the auction must dedicate financial and personal resources 
to the conceptualisation, administration, processing, and monitoring of the programme. 
Moreover, advertising is necessary to attract a large pool of bidders. Some practitioners argue 
that the running of an inverse auction and related cost-effectiveness gains are set off by 
increased transaction and human resources costs. These cost rise with the complexity of the 
environmental policy measure (Mettepenningen et al. 2011) and with individualised 
procedures, e.g. on-site assessments or information meetings. However, these meetings 
provide opportunities to build social capital with the participating landholders, which can 
induce better compliance in the contract phase.  
From the agency’s perspective, concluding a contract with a seller also implies a site-specific 
investment. Given the positive correlation between duration of a conservation contract and its 
ecological benefits, the site value increases with the time enrolled in a programme. Contract 
expiration and termination of payments often results in farmers returning to their previous 
practices (IUCN 2009; OECD 2010; Sullivan et al. 2004). Consequently, losing a seller can 





3. The fundamental transformation, lock-in effects and the role of 
social capital  
A repeated conservation auction establishes bidder asymmetry: A previous contracting history 
leads to competitive advantages due to programme-relevant experience, reputation as a 
contractor, and specific assets already factored into bids in earlier bidding rounds. As a 
consequence, we argue that there is a risk for conservation auctions to degenerate into a rather 
symbolic act involving only the “usual suspects” in the long-run. Reeson et al. (2012) report 
that strong heterogeneity in environmental values can lead to the dominance of “a small 
number of bidders” over time. Groth (2010) also sees potential for gradually reduced 
competition in repeated auction-based conservation schemes, contradicting the rationale of an 
inverse auction.  
According to Oliver Williamson’s conclusions on the subject of contractual relationships 
between sellers and buyers (1985), competition transforms into a bilateral monopoly for 
transactions involving specific assets (known as the “fundamental transformation”). 
Williamson notes that “such investments are [..] risky, in that specialised assets cannot be 
redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if contracts should be interrupted or 
prematurely terminated” (1985, p. 54). As a consequence, contractors can be locked-in in the 
sense that the potential benefit of continuing the transaction relationship is higher than 
terminating and switching to other partners.  
We argue that participation in a conservation programme involves specific assets on the 
sellers’ side, including the dedication of acreage, adaptation of managerial practices and 
acquisition of specific knowledge. Once enrolled in a programme, landholders become more 
competitive in subsequent auctions compared to previously unsuccessful bidders but incur 
losses through quasi-rents if the contract is not renewed. As a consequence, landholders 
interested in a long-term contract relationship have clear incentives to make relationship-
specific investments and reciprocate with non-opportunistic behaviour. 
As to the agency acting as buyer, we argue that the building of social capital and institutional 
trust is crucial for the conservation outcome. While there is an initial need to identify cost-
effective bidders, periodic re-enrolment is valued by the agency since it creates trust and 
reduces uncertainty about the quality of the provided conservation service. In order to achieve 
effective results, the agency becomes likewise dependent on the programme participants and 
on their specific acreage. 
Hence, with the beginning of the second competitive sign-up for conservation contracts, 
bidders are asymmetric with regard to specific assets, learning experience, and reputation. 
Inequality amongst bidders is maintained and consolidated in subsequent rounds, leading to 
increasingly asymmetric chances of winning the contract and the dominance of some bidders. 
Moreover, the agency has a twofold interest in maintaining long-term contract relationships: 
increasing social capital (reducing opportunism) and avoiding ecological costs, which would 





landholders should face incentives to terminate an on-going contract relationship, which 
results in the establishment of long-term contract relationships.  
3.1. Expected impact of lock-in effects on auction performance 
Whether lock-in effects constitute challenges or opportunities depends on their effect on the 
conservation output (ecological effectiveness), on the competition amongst bidders, and on 
the cost-effectiveness criterion (Table 1). The existing empirical evidence points towards the 
fact that learning effects, specific investments and strong social capital, benefit the ecological 
effectiveness of conservation measures. However, they all bear the risk of reduced 
competition as they create advantages for insiders against outsiders. Learning effects can 
decrease the auction’s cost-effectiveness if they imply strategic bidding and inflated bids, but 
can also increase cost-effectiveness if they reflect an improved understanding of procedures 
and costs. Once they are sunk, specific investments in physical assets, human capital and 
changed management practices increase the cost-benefit ratio but their initial costs are high.  
Still, the effect of social capital is unclear. Bidders with high reputation might not be the 
lowest-priced suppliers and, consequently, the auction could set perverse incentives and 
destroy relationship-specific assets. Hence, social capital leads to improved cost-effectiveness 
only if landholders in long-term contract relationships are incentivised to refrain from 
opportunism. 
Table 1: Typology of influential variables for the performance of conservation programmes 
Impact factor Learning Specific assets Social capital 
Ecological effectiveness  + + +  
Competition  - /+ - -  
Cost-effectiveness - /+ + ? 
   (-) negative; (+) positive; (-/+) both directions possible; (?) uncertain 
3.2.  Empirical evidence for lock-in effects in laboratory auctions 
In the following section, data from two laboratory experiments (Vogt et al. 2013; Vogt, in 
preparation) provide empirical evidence on the conditions under which lock-in effects in 
repeated conservation auctions are likely to occur. Both experiments have a different research 
focus from the question scrutinised here, however, their unique experimental market design 
enables us to draw conclusions in the context of repeated auctioning. Both experiments are 
based on an inverse auction market for the provision of a public good that is produced in an 
effort-level game (cf. Fehr et al. 1997), and represent key features of auction-based 
conservation programmes.  
In both experiments, one round of the game consists of a bid selection and a contract stage. In 
the bid selection stage, a fixed number of bidders compete for contracts with an auctioneer 
who chooses bidders on the basis of their sealed offers. There is no formalised auction metric, 
though, the auctioneer is endowed with a budget and keeps the residual amount. In the 





determines the part of the received payment the bidder will re-invest to fulfil the contract. In 
this way, the contracting bidder’s investment generates a public good that is split amongst all 
participants of the market. The more the bidder invests, the higher the share of the public 
good for everyone. The inherent moral hazard problem requires the auctioneer to put trust in 
the bidder’s offer signal and the bidder to reciprocate and perform non-selfishly, otherwise the 
level of the public good is socially suboptimal. In Vogt et al. (2013; hereafter COM), text-
based bilateral communication prior to the bidding phase allows for cheap talk between 
bidders and auctioneers; while in Vogt (in preparation; hereafter RISK), contract performance 
can be affected by a probabilistic effort transformation that is known ex ante to the 
contracting bidder but unverifiable ex post by the auctioneer.7 Table 2 summarises the two 
experimental treatments. 
Table 2: Overview of the experimental treatments 
 
Market-based provision of public goods with 
Communication (Vogt et al. 2013) Environmental Risk (Vogt, in 
prep.) 
Participants  (subset) 66 52 
Sessions (subset) 4 4 
Number of markets  11 13 
Market size 6 (1 buyer, 5 bidders) 4 (1 buyer, 3 bidders) 
Contracts allocated per period 2 1 
Random chance of contracting 40 % 33,3 % 
Periods played* 12 20 
Feedback  Incomplete Incomplete 
Fixed player types Yes Yes  
Fixed IDs  Yes Yes  
Test design Within-subject** Between-subject  
Time of experimentation  February 2012 November-December 2012 
Note: Only subsets of data are reported as relevant here, data in the second column corresponds to the 
communication in the first phase of market interaction (C1) treatment of Vogt et al. (2013), data in the third 
column corresponds to the fixed identities and effort multiplier (MFID) treatment of Vogt, in prep. Both 
computerised experiments were conducted in the Goettingen Laboratory of Behavioural Economics, based on z-
tree software, participants were mostly students with different academic backgrounds. *The total number of 
periods was not announced to avoid end-game effects. ** First treatment phase reported here. 
Both experiments employ treatments with repetition and fixed identities, enabling us to 
compare repeated bidding and the iterative selection of contractors over several periods. A 
locked-in contract relationship is measured by its consecutive (uninterrupted) length given the 
random chance of concluding a contract. Favouring the same bidder over more than two 
periods implies that an auctioneer does not want to trade the established payment-profit ratio 
                                                            
7 The risk parameter {0.5, 1.0, 1.5} models environmental risk common in land management and agricultural 
production, it was evenly distributed and had an expected value of {1}. Hence, auctioneers should not alter their 





of the on-going relationship for a risky alternative. Measured by the random chance of 
winning a contract per period, both markets are similarly competitive in terms of rivalry 
amongst bidders. 8 However, they differ in their possibility to learn and build social capital.  
Learning has been identified as one substantial cause of bidder asymmetry since successful 
bidders are able to re-adjust their bids in subsequent rounds based on previous contracting 
experience. In both experimental auction markets, the cost associated to different performance 
levels is common knowledge and identical for every bidder in both experiments, but the 
feedback mechanism to the auctioneer and non-contracting bidders is incomplete9. Hence, 
only bidders who enter the contract stage gain experience with the interplay of performance 
and payment structure and can adjust their bids subsequently. These benefits of learning are 
reduced in the RISK market, as the random multiplier introduces cost uncertainty that applies 
to every bidder in the bidding stage. Hence, only in the COM market learning takes place 
effectively (Hypothesis 1).   
Social capital and its components trust, reputation and networking have been identified as a 
second source of bidder asymmetry provoking lock-in effects. In the RISK market, fixed 
identities allow the re-identification of market participants over time while other forms of 
direct interaction amongst players are unavailable. In contrast, the COM market with its 
bilateral chatting tool offers substantial opportunities for bidders to interact with the 
auctioneer, and vice versa. Every bidder is granted the same access to the auctioneer but the 
total chatting time is limited to three minutes per period, inducing potential variation in the 
amount of communication with the single bidders. Although non-binding and text-based, 
communication simplifies the creation of trust amongst players and improves the formation of 
reputation despite the incomplete feedback mechanism. Hence, the COM market is 
characterised by longer-lasting contract-relationships than the RISK market (Hypothesis 2). 
Table 3: Time trends and means of key market variables 
 COM RISK 
 Mean Trend Mean Trend 
Offers made by bidders 167.9 (2.3)  (3.38) 175.6 (1.5)  (0.96) 
Payments to auction winners 176.3 (2.3)  (3.38) 161.8 (2.4)  ( – 0.17) 
Performance of auction winners 
(effort levels)* 
  73.0 (1.8)  (4.30)   64.9 (1.7)  (0.82) 
Note: Mean values are presented with standard errors in parentheses. The direction of the arrow symbolises the 
direction of the time trend, lopsided arrows show tendency. The t statistics of a linear regression of period on the 
respective variable is reported in parentheses (estimated over 12 periods for COM and 20 periods for RISK).       
* Untransformed effort levels are reported in the RISK scenario. Data originally published in Vogt et al. (2013), 
and Vogt, in prep. 
                                                            
8 While in COM two contracts are allocated amongst five bidders (40 %), in the RISK treatment three bidders 
compete for one contract (33.3%).  
9 In COM only the sum of both contracts’ effort is announced and in RISK only the contracting bidder knows 





In both markets the social optimum is achieved if the auctioneer makes a payment of 200 and 
bidders reciprocate with a performance level of 100. The COM market outperforms the RISK 
market with regard to higher payments and performance levels, while bidders made higher 
offers in the RISK scenario (Table 3). It is striking that auctioneers favoured higher to lower 
offers if they were able to communicate with their bidders, but vice versa, if they were 
deprived of communication and moreover faced additional output uncertainty. 
Figure 2: Probability of re-concluding a contract in two experimental 
scenarios of a repeated inverse auction 
  
 Note: The grey shaded parts denote the random probability (resulting from the
 number of bidders and contracts) of every bidder to conclude a contract. The 
darker shaded parts show the excess probability. The total percentage share gives 
the probability of consecutive contracting. Data originally published in Vogt et al. 
(2013); cf. Vogt, in preparation. 
 
As the establishment of the social optimum is counterintuitive to the competitive logic of an 
inverse auction, we approximate learning effects by the time trends of the market variables: 
offers made by bidders, payments and performance levels of auction winners (cf. Table 3). 
All three key variables follow a strong positive time trend in the market with communication, 
while the picture is ambiguous and insignificant in the market struck by risk. This confirms 
our first hypothesis on the limited learning effects in the RISK scenario. Moreover, it shows 
the benefits associated with learning in the auction with communication. Since offers and 
performance increase simultaneously, learning effects do not lead to efficiency losses and 
strategic bidding but cause a “social gift exchange” instead (cf. Vogt et al. 2013). The 
establishment of such a mechanism is much more difficult if a random factor affects the 
output and contractors have no possibility to exchange experience with the auctioneer. The 
results of the RISK market show that auctioneers then rather apply market principles and 





Similar to a “market for lemons” low payments yield low re-investments by bidders since 
higher performance levels cannot be financed. Under these conditions, any learning 
experience gained by contracting bidders is ineffective, confirming Hypothesis 1. 
If social capital accounts for the establishment of bidder asymmetry and relationship-specific 
assets generate lock-in effects, auctioneers should follow distinct selection strategies in each 
experimental scenario. Indeed, this is the case. Bidders in the inverse auction with social 
capital formation had a clearly higher probability to re-conclude a contract with the auctioneer 
(Figure 2). In contrast to the RISK market where contract allocation was almost entirely 
random, the random chance was exceeded by 15.4 percentage points in the market with 
communication.  
Figure 3: Cumulative frequency of contract relationships of different lengths 
and corresponding performance levels in two experimental scenarios of a 
repeated inverse auction  
 
Note: Number of observations is 264 in the COM and 265 in the RISK scenario. 
Potential maximum length of contract relationship is 12 in the COM and 20 in the 
RISK scenario. Data originally published in Vogt et al. (2013); cf. Vogt, in 
preparation.  
 
Further differences across markets are shown in Figure 3 (solid lines), which illustrates the 
composition of consecutive contract relationships in both markets. Auctioneers facing 





























































communication, resulting in the termination of almost 90 % of contract relationships after not 
more than two consecutive contracts. Being able to communicate, auctioneers more often 
contracted with the same bidder, repeatedly. Hence, in the COM market roughly 30 % of all 
relationships exceeded two consecutive contracts. Interestingly, although every bidder had the 
same access to the chatting tool, the amount of conversation varied substantially10. Indeed, the 
number of chat lines sent to the auctioneer before issuing an offer had a significant positive 
impact on the probability of receiving a contract (cf. Vogt et al. 2013). The variation in the 
amount of conversation, an increased re-acceptance probability and longer contract 
relationships point towards a reduced bidding competition under social capital formation and 
bring up the question of opportunistic bidder behaviour in locked-in relationships.  
But, reduced competition does not necessarily lead to poorer performance in an inverse 
auction for a public good. Quite the contrary is true; relationship length and performance level 
are positively correlated in the market scenario with social capital formation (cf. Figure 3, 
dashed line in black). The more locked-in a relationship between bidder and auctioneer 
becomes in the COM market, the higher the resulting performance. This strong relationship is 
not observed in the market with RISK although there is some evidence for a positive length-
performance-correlation in contract relationships based on three to five consecutive contracts 
(cf. dashed line in grey).11 In sum, Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed: Social capital resulting 
from bilateral communication favours the establishment of locked-in relationships. Moreover, 
long-term relationships pay off with regard to the provision of the public good.  
4. Conclusion 
If cost-effective conservation instruments to safeguard ecological goods are to be established 
with the support of the relevant stakeholders, the role of relationships between them should 
not be neglected. We provide conceptual-theoretical as well as initial empirical support to the 
discussion on the long-term performance of repeated conservation auctions using a 
transaction cost economics approach complemented by the dimension of social capital. We 
pointed out that learning, specific assets, and social capital have the potential to generate 
asymmetries amongst bidders who repeatedly participate in conservation auctions. We 
reviewed the relevant empirical literature on auction-based conservation programmes and 
showed where in the tendering and contracting process learning effects, social capital 
formation and specific assets play a role. Applying Williamson’s concept of the fundamental 
transformation of a competitive process into bilateral monopolies (1985), we argued that 
repeated conservation auctions bear the risk of lock-in effects which affect the auction’s 
competition, cost-effectiveness and ecological effectiveness. 
                                                            
10 In the respective subsample treatment of Vogt et al. (2013) the mean number of chat lines sent per period was 
1.8 for bidders (standard deviation = 2.4) and 7.1 for auctioneers (standard deviation = 4.0). 
11  Though, only based on three observations, the data shown in Figure 3 indicates that mean performance 





By comparing laboratory data from two experimental inverse auctions based on a contract 
selection and a contract execution stage, we provided initial empirical evidence for the 
conditions under which lock-in effects in inverse auctions occur and how they affect contract 
performance. In the experimental auction characterised by a constant experimental 
environment, learning effects fostered the gradual adjustment of key market variables towards 
the socially optimal performance level. Moreover, a communication channel between 
auctioneer and bidders actively encouraged the creation of social capital. We demonstrated 
that in this experimental auction relationship-specific investments significantly affected 
contracting behaviour of auctioneers, leading to long-term contract relationships with 
particular bidders. However, these locked-in relationships were characterised by superior 
performance levels.  
Compared to the experimental auction with communication, in the second scenario without 
communication but with environmental risk auctioneers did not develop preferences for 
specific bidders. Instead of allowing direct interaction, the experimental scenario introduced 
additional output uncertainty for the auctioneer by means of a probabilistic effort 
transformation only known to the contracting bidder. We showed that this parameter destroys 
positive learning effects and also induces auctioneers to select bidders rather randomly. While 
competition could be maintained in the inverse auction, the overall performance of the market 
was inferior with a suboptimal provision of the public good. Hence, a lack of trust in the 
bidders significantly reduced the auction’s cost-effectiveness. 
Our findings demonstrate that lock-in effects do not erode the effectiveness of an auction but 
change the rules of the game towards more favourable market conditions for the provision of 
the public good. Thus, auctioning is not only about finding the lowest-cost supplier but also 
identifying those who are intrinsically motivated (cf. Lockie 2013). This is especially 
important in view of the second market scenario. Since environmental risk is an integral 
component of every conservation effort involving resource and land management, the 
mediocre performance of the second experimental scenario is an alarm signal. Trust-based 
working relations and long-term contract relationships would have been necessary to 
overcome the challenges posed by random performance shocks. But the market scenario did 
not provide opportunities for direct interaction. Therefore, the most important lesson for 
designers of contracts for payments for ecosystem services is the necessity to build sufficient 
social capital with conservation stakeholders in order to effectively deal with situations 
characterised by high environmental risk and uncertainty.  
As the creation of social capital amongst the landholders and the environmental agency is 
important for effective conservation programmes, programme designers should focus more on 
establishing long-term contract relationships, for instance, by means of differential treatment 
or longer contract durations. If contract re-enrolment would be excluded from the competitive 
sign-up and made conditional on other criteria, social capital indicators could become an 
institutionalised feature of contract allocation. Differential treatment would enable the agency 





Another possibility to (implicitly) address bidder asymmetry is contract duration. A longer 
contract (10 to 15 years) reduces the frequency of re-enrolment and increases the time span in 
which land is covered under a conservation measure.  
Especially, laboratory experiments are suited to pre-test new design elements as they provide 
the controlled environment to thoroughly differentiate between contract allocation and 
contract execution. Future research activity should thus be directed towards further empirical 
work on the distinct sources of bidder asymmetry and behavioural implications, to further 
improve the effectiveness of incentive-based conservation programmes.  
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Payments for ecosystem services (PES) and their allocation via competitive tendering 
processes is an important and innovative instrument in the battle against on-going biodiversity 
loss. Based on a contractual arrangement between a service provider and a private or public 
entity willing to buy the conservation service, favourable land management activities or 
extensive agricultural practices can be stipulated. The advantage of PES is the direct monetary 
incentive for conservation effort, as a public good, and the potential to achieve a level of 
environmental protection that exceeds the bottom line drawn by environmental legislation. Its 
disadvantage is the profound degree of information asymmetry within the contract 
relationship that results from using environmental goods as an asset and from the nature of 
economic decision-making.  
Analysing the interdependent relationship between competitiveness and compliance, and 
demonstrating the importance of trust and reciprocity in contracts for environmental goods, 
this thesis contributes to the rich and multidisciplinary literature on payments for ecosystem 
services, and conservation auctions in particular. During the past 25 years, practitioners, 
scholars and scientists have been constantly improving and expanding our understanding on 
the functioning of inverse auctions for allocating PES contracts. Research mainly focussed on 
the auction metrics and bidding behaviour, whilst the resulting contract relationships between 
programme managers as buyers and landholders as sellers have not been sufficiently 
addressed. However, as shown in this thesis, their relationship is the key to the success of a 
market-based conservation programme.  
In this thesis, three articles set out the argument that trust and reciprocity are relevant in 
overcoming problems of asymmetric information inherent to competitively allocated PES 
contracts. A two-stage experimental test scenario, developed for this purpose, simulates the 
decision-making process in the inverse auction market and the subsequent contract execution 
in the laboratory. Using this test design in a first experiment, it is demonstrated that 
conservation auctions bear a profound risk of adverse selection, moral hazard and, thus, 
suboptimal contract results. However, market failure can be effectively overcome by means of 
trust-building institutions, such as communication between sellers and buyers. Personal 
interactions induce market participants to change their individually rational behaviour in a 
more socially optimal way. However, the social benefit comes at the expense of a certain 
degree of market bilateralisation. A second experiment illustrates how crucially necessary 
trust-based contract relationships become if the contracting and provisioning environments 
are heavily distorted by external, stochastic influences. In this case cooperation almost 






Finally, comparing the results of these two experiments in a third article it becomes obvious 
that stable long-term contract relationships in auction-based PES programmes ought to be 
fostered and not be prevented. While, from a conservation point of view, stable and trust-
based contract relationships are favourable to random short-term contracting, they are also 
shown to be more cost-effective in economic terms. This reveals a significant challenge for 
programme designers to provide sufficient opportunities to build social capital between 
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